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Abstract—The application of successive interference
cancellation (SIC) introduces critical security risks to cooperative
non-orthogonal multiple access (NOMA) systems in the presence
of untrustworthy network nodes, referred to as internal
eavesdroppers. To address this potential security and reliability
flaw, by assuming all users are untrusted, this letter investigates
the effective secrecy throughput (EST) for a cooperative NOMA
system, where a near user serves as an amplify-and-forward
relay to help forward the information of a far user. Considering
the inverse power allocation and SIC decoding order, a
novel jamming strategy is proposed to enhance the security
performance of the far user. Gauss-Chebyshev approximations of
ESTs over Nakagami-m channels are derived. Asymptotic EST
expressions are proposed to provide further insights. Numerical
results demonstrate that the proposed jamming strategy and
the inverse power allocation and SIC decoding order are both
essential for achieving positive secrecy rates for both users.
Index Terms-Non-orthogonal multiple access, untrusted inter-
nal users, effective secrecy throughput
I. INTRODUCTION
Non-orthogonal multiple access (NOMA) has drawn signifi-
cant attention due to its potential to improve spectral efficiency
by serving multiple users over a single resource block [1].
Moreover, cooperative NOMA is regarded as an effective way
to guarantee fairness among users, where a near NOMA user
acts as a relay to help establish connections between the
base station (BS) and far weak users [2]. However, due to
the broadcast nature of wireless communication networks as
well as the application of successive interference cancellation
(SIC), NOMA is faced with severe security concerns [3], [4].
The security performance of cooperative NOMA with external
eavesdropping has been studied in [5]–[7]. Furthermore, as
network nodes of NOMA systems may be untrusted, NOMA
systems are exposed to risks of internal eavesdropping. Secure
transmission for non-cooperative NOMA systems with internal
eavesdropping has been investigated in [8]–[10].
Note that the above studies either consider cooperative NO-
MA with external eavesdropping [5]–[7], or non-cooperative
with only one untrusted user [8]–[10]. For cooperative NOMA
systems, since SIC can be applied at all users [8], on one
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hand, it is difficult to achieve positive secrecy rates for a
far user since an untrusted near user can easily intercept
messages intended for the former due to the stronger channel
gain between the BS and the near user [11]. On the other
hand, an untrusted far user may access the information of a
near user, which results in confidential information leakage.
Therefore, for cooperative NOMA in the presence of internal
eavesdropping, both near user and far user are faced with risks
of being eavesdropped upon, and it is of importance to study
security issues for cooperative NOMA with untrusted users.
We have, however, noticed that the effective secrecy
throughput (EST), a measure of the rate at which information
can be transferred securely in the presence of eavesdroppers
[12], has not been studied for cooperative NOMA with un-
trusted internal adversaries. In this letter, we propose an
approach to secure the transmissions in a two-user cooperative
NOMA, using EST as the performance metric1, for situations
in which a near user U1 plays the role of an amplify-and-
forward (AF) relay for a far user U2. Different from [8]–[10],
we consider a purely antagonistic network in which both U1
and U2 are untrusted, and can act as passive eavesdroppers
intercepting confidential messages intended for the other user.
More importantly, we consider the inverse power allocation
and SIC decoding order of standard NOMA, i.e., more transmit
power is allocated to U1, so that U1 should first decode its own
message. It is noted that though less power is allocated to U2,
the reliability is still guaranteed in our model as EST ensures
that the achievable data rate is larger than or equal to the rate
requirement. To enhance security performance, a novel jam-
ming strategy is proposed, where the jamming signal is sent
by U2 to confuse U1. Compared with external jamming [10],
[13], the proposed strategy avoids communication overhead,
and the jamming can be eliminated by U2 before decoding its
own information.
In this letter, we show that jamming and inverting power
allocation and SIC decoding order are both essential to achieve
positive ESTs for both NOMA users. If we allocate more
power to U2, according to the standard NOMA, its message x2
will be decodable at U1 and thus is unprotected. If jamming
is used to induce secrecy for x2 leaving U1 unable to decode
x2, then U1 will not be able to decode its own message x1
either (because of the SIC order). To validate the performance
of the proposed strategy, Gauss-Chebyshev approximations
are derived for the ESTs. Numerical results demonstrate that
our jamming strategy outperforms the benchmark scheme and
ensures positive secrecy rates for both users.
1The considered two-user model can be easily extended to multiple NOMA
clusters by performing user pairing, where each cluster is composed of a near
user and a far user. By allocating orthogonal frequency bands to different
NOMA clusters, each NOMA pair can be managed independently.
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II. SYSTEM MODEL
Consider a cooperative NOMA system, which is composed
of one BS and two users, i.e., a near user U1 and a far user U2.
The BS transmits information to U2 with the help of U1, since
there is no direct link between the BS and U2 due to shadow
fading and severe blocking. U1 and U2 are considered to be
untrusted by each other, i.e., both U1 and U2 can act as internal
eavesdroppers. Each node is equipped with a single antenna
and operates in half-duplex mode. The channel coefficients
between the BS and U1, and from U1 to U2 are denoted as h1
and h12, respectively. All channels are assumed to experience
Nakagami-m fading with E[|hi|2] = Ωi and fading parameters
mi, i = {1, 12}.
During the first slot, the BS transmits the superimposed
signals of x1 and x2 to the near user. Following Wyner’s work
on secrecy capacity [14], [15], x1 and x2 are coded as the
code-word rates (R1,t, R2,t) and secrecy rates (R1,s, R2,s),
respectively. Meanwhile, the far user transmits a jamming







PIx0 + n1, (1)
where Ps is the transmit power at the BS, a1 and a2 are the
power coefficients of U1 and U2 with a1+a2 = 1 and a1 > a2,
n1 denotes additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) at U1 with
variance σ2, x0 is the jamming signal and PI denotes the
received jamming power at U1.
Since more power is allocated to x1, based on the principle
of SIC, U1 first decodes x1 by treating x2 as interference, and
then U1 may eavesdrop upon the signal of U2, i.e., U1 decodes
x2 after subtracting the decoded x1. Therefore, the received
signal-to-interference-ratio (SINR) of x1 and the eavesdropped
SINR of x2 at U1 can be expressed as
γ1 =
a1ρs|h1|2






where ρs = Psσ2 and ρI =
PI
σ2 .
During the second transmission slot, U1 amplifies and for-
wards its received signal to U2 with an amplifying coefficient
G. So, the received signal at U2 can be expressed as




Ps|h1|2+PI+σ2 , where PR denotes the transmit
power at U1, and n2 is AWGN at U2 with variance σ2.
As x1 is allocated with more power, x1 is decoded by
treating the signal of x2 as noise. Consequently, at U2, the




a2ρsρR|h1|2|h12|2 + ρs|h1|2 + ρR|h12|2 + ρI + 1
,
(4)
where ρR = PRσ2 .
After subtracting the information of U1 from the received
signals, the received SINR of U2 is given by
γ2 =
a2ρsρR|h1|2|h12|2
ρs|h1|2 + ρR|h12|2 + ρI + 1
. (5)
III. SECRECY PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this section, EST is adopted as the performance met-
ric. EST is defined as the average transmitted secrecy rate
from transmitter to receiver without being successfully eaves-
dropped upon, which characterizes the reliability and security
of the system.
A. Exact Expressions
The ESTs of U1 and U2 are defined as
η1 = R1,sPr[γ1 > θ1,t, γ2→1 < θ1,s], (6a)
η2 = R2,sPr[γ2 > θ2,t, γ1→2 < θ2,s]. (6b)
where θ1,t = 22R1,t − 1, θ2,t = 22R2,t − 1, θ1,s =
22(R1,t−R1,s) − 1, and θ2,s = 22(R2,t−R2,s) − 1.
By substituting (2a) and (4) into (6a), we can derive that
η1 = R1,sPr
[








Clearly, when a1 − a2θ1,t < 0, η1 = 0. Since θ1,t ≥ θ1,s,
on the condition that a1 − a2θ1,t > 0, (7) can be rewritten as
η1 = R1,sPr[ρs|h1|2 > χ1,
ρsρR|h1|2|h12|2





a1−a2θ1,t , and χ2 =
θ1,s
a1−a2θ1,s .
To investigate the security of cooperative NOMA with
jamming signals, the following theorem is presented to provide
an approximation for η1.
Theorem 1: An approximation of η1 is given as (9), shown











2 δl, δl =
cos( (2l−1)π2L ), and U(x) =
{
1, x > 0
0. x ≤ 0 .
Proof : By denoting X = ρs|h1|2 and Y = ρR|h12|2 with
E[X] = ΩX and E[Y ] = ΩY , and fading parameters mX and
mY , the probability term in η1 can be expressed as
P = Pr[X > χ1,
XY
X + Y + ρI + 1
< χ2]
= Pr[X > χ1, (X − χ2)Y < χ2(X + ρI + 1)]. (11)
Based on the values of χ1 and χ2, two cases are considered:
Case 1: χ1 ≤ χ2; Case 2: χ1 > χ2.



















−mXxΩX and probability densi-





























η1 = U(a1 − a2θ1,t)R1,s
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(λ1,l − χ2)(χ1 − λ1,l)
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−mXχ1ΩX , (b) is obtained by adopting
[16, Eq. (3.478,4)], and Kv(z) represents the Bessel functions
of imaginary argument [17].















By applying Gauss-Chebyshev integration, the approxima-
tion for P2 can be given by

















(λl − χ2)(χ1 − λl)(











where ωl = πL , L denotes the approximation order for






Hence, a complete analytical expression for the probability
term in η1 can be written as P = U(χ2 − χ1)P1 + U(χ1 −
χ2)P2. Then, (9) can be derived via replacing ΩX and ΩY
with ρsΩ1 and ρRΩ12, respectively.
Remark 1: According to (9), η1 is a monotonically decreas-
ing function of PR and PI , but increases monotonically with
Ps. Moreover, the power allocation factors and the code-word
rate need to be carefully set to satisfy a1 − a2θ1,t > 0 to
achieve nonzero η1.
For η2, by substituting (2b) and (5) into (6b), we have
η2 = R2,sPr[
ρsρR|h1|2|h12|2
ρs|h1|2 + ρR|h12|2 + ρI + 1









Theorem 2: An exact expression for η2 is given in
















Proof : By denoting X = ρs|h1|2 and Y = ρR|h12|2, the
probability term in η2 can be written as
P = Pr[X < z2,
XY








































Fig. 1. The ESTs of U1 and U2 vs. Ps with PR = −2 dBm
and PI = −10 dBm.
where ϕ(x) = z1(x+ρI+1)x−z1 .
By employing Gauss-Chebyshev integration, the approxi-




























where λl = z1+z22 +
z1−z2
2 δl, and δl = cos(
(2l−1)π
2L ).
By replacing ΩX and ΩY with ρsΩ1 and ρRΩ12, and after
some algebraic manipulations, an approximation for η2 can be
finally given in (17).
Remark 2: (17) indicates that η2 is not a monotonic func-
tion of either Ps or PI , thus Ps and PI should be carefully
chosen. Particularly, a nonzero η2 can only be obtained under
the condition that ρI >
θ2,t
θ2,s
− 1, which shows that jamming
is essential for the secure transmission of U2. Note that an
infinite PI results in zero η2, which reveals that η2 can be
maximized with an optimal PI .
B. Asymptotic Expressions
Based on the derived expressions for η1 and η2, we can
see that the infinite PR and PI result in zero η1, and η2
becomes zero with infinite Ps. Thus, we provide an asymptotic
expression for η1 as Ps → ∞, and one for η2 as PR → ∞.
When Ps → ∞ and a1 − a2θ1,t > 0, η1 can be expressed
as









−mXxΩX , we can derive an asymptotic






























Fig. 2. The ESTs of U1 and U2 vs. PR with Ps = 36 dBm
and PI = −10 dBm.
When PR → ∞, an asymptotic closed-form expression for




























Remark 3: According to (21) and (22), we can see that the
ESTs of U1 and U2 tend to nonzero constants when Ps → ∞
and PR → ∞, respectively, as ηPs→∞1 is determined by the
second slot, while ηPR→∞2 is determined by the first slot.
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we present numerical results to evaluate
the performance of the proposed cooperative NOMA system.
The parameters are set as follows, unless otherwise stated.
The average channel gains are chosen as Ωi = 1dαi , where
i ∈ {1, 12}, the distance di = 20m, and α = 2.7 denoting
the path loss exponent. Without loss of generality, we set
L = 50, R1,t = R2,t = 1 BPCU, R1,s = R2,s = 0.6
BPCU, and uniform Nakagami-m fading is assumed for all
channels, where m1 = m12 = 2. The background noise power
is assumed to be -50 dBm.
In Fig. 1, the relationship between the EST and the transmit
power at the BS (Ps) is presented. As can be observed from
Fig. 1, the derived analytical results are consistent with those
from the simulations, and both users can achieve positive
secrecy rate when Ps ranges from 33 dBm to 42 dBm. We
can see that increasing Ps enhances the secrecy performance
of U1, and the EST of U1 converges to asymptotic values as Ps
gradually increases. Moreover, the EST of U2 first increases
and then decreases, which reveals that there exists an optimal
Ps to maximize the EST of U2. In addition, for the near user
U1, decreasing the power allocation fraction at the near user
results in better secrecy performance in the low transmit power
regime, while better system performance can be achieved when
a larger power is allocated to the near user in the high transmit
power region. However, the relationship between the far user
U2 and the power coefficient a1 is inverse to that of U1 and a1.
The reason for this is that, the impact of the jamming signal
is negligible when Ps becomes larger.
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(a) The EST of U1 vs. PI with Ps = 10 dBm and PR =
−20 dBm











(b) The EST of U2 vs. PI with Ps = 10 dBm and
PR = 20 dBm
Fig. 3. The ESTs vs. PI .
Fig. 2 plots the ESTs of U1 and U2 versus PR with Ps = 36
dBm and PI = −10 dBm. Cooperative NOMA without
jamming, namely ’U1 w/o jamming’ and ’U2 w/o jamming’,
is plotted as the comparison scheme. For cooperative NOMA
without jamming, we can see that though the EST of U1
outperforms that of the proposed jamming strategy, the EST
of U2 remains at zero, thus indicating that U2 cannot achieve
secure transmission. The derived analytical results coincide
precisely with those of the simulations. We can see that the
EST of U1 decreases with PR, and the EST of U2 converges to
asymptotic values as PR increases. This is because increasing
PR results in a larger achievable rate of U2 as well as a
larger interception rate for U2 detecting the information of
U1. Moreover, U1 can always benefit from the larger power
allocated to the near user, while increasing a1 degrades the
secrecy performance of U2 in the low PR region, but improves
the EST of U2 when PR becomes larger. The reason for this is
that, for the data rate of U2, the impact of the power allocation
factor a2 overwhelms the effect of PR when PR is relatively
small, and PR plays the leading role in the high power region.
In Fig. 3, the ESTs of U1 and U2 versus PI are presented,
respectively. As can be seen from Fig. 3. (a), the EST of U1
decreases with PI since PI interferes the achievable SINR
of U1 as well as the intercept SINR of U2. The EST of
U2 first increases and then decreases, thus an optimal PI
exists to maximize the EST. Moreover, for U1 and U2, more
stable channels, i.e., larger Nakagami-m fading parameters,
contribute to the improvement of the EST in the low power
regime, and degrade the secrecy performance with a higher
PI .
V. CONCLUSION
In this letter, to address open security issues for a two-
user cooperative NOMA network, the inverse power allocation
and SIC decoding order as well as a novel jamming strategy
have been proposed to overcome information leakage in the
presence of internal untrusted near and far users. To evaluate
the performance of the proposed system, Gauss-Chebyshev
approximations and an asymptotic analysis of the ESTs have
been derived for both users. Numerical results have validated
that the proposed jamming strategy supports secure transmis-
sions, while the jamming power needs to be chosen carefully
to achieve satisfactory secrecy performance. The impacts of
Ps and PR on EST values have also been illustrated.
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